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Abstract
Noch immer ist das Konzept des Totalitarismus stark
mit der auf absolute Kontrolle der Gesellschaft abzielen-
den Zentralisierung von allumfassender Macht verbun-
den. Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit einem Konzept
des Totalitarismus, das zwar bereits ansatzweise von
Friedrich und Brzezinski aufgegriffen, aber erst in den
letzten zehn Jahren zunehmend bekannter wurde.
Totalitarismus wird dabei als ein Experiment der
Sozialkonstruktion verstanden. Es zielt darauf, um
jeden Preis eine neue Gesellschaft zu erschaffen und
eine anthropologische Revolution in Gang zu setzen.
Angewandt auf die „Ideokratie“ führt dies zu der
Annahme, dass einige totalitäre Regime sich zeitweise
nicht nur durch die Manipulation von Gedanken legiti-
miert haben, sondern auch durch eine Welle populisti-
scher Begeisterung für die von den Machtträgern ver-
sprochene Aussicht auf eine neue Ära, die aus der alten
Ordnung hervorgeht. Gewalttaten sind diesem „palin -
genetischen Mythos“ nach weniger ein Mittel der bar -
barischen Zerstörung, sondern legitimieren sich viel-
mehr als Geburtswehen zur Etablierung einer neuen
Ordnung. In diesem Beitrag wird diese populistische
Begeisterung im Umkehrschluss mit dem Bestreben in
Verbin dung gebracht, den entzauberten und nihi -
listischen Tendenzen der Moderne übersinn liche Phä -
nomene entgegenzusetzen.
I. Introduction : Ideocracy and Totalitarianism
This paper will explore the thesis that spontaneous, non - coerced popular enthu-
siasm for the revolutionary aspirations of an ideocracy, both before and after the
seizure of power, has been crucial for the perceived legitimation of several major
totalitarian movements and regimes in the modern age. For the purposes of this
analysis, the connotations of the suffix - cracy are taken to be those of theocracy,
autocracy, and ethnocracy, thus suggesting a political system dominated by the
primacy of a particular idea ( a totalizing vision or grand récit ) of historical devel-
opment which serves as the basis for realizing a new society, and even for found-
ing a new historical era. This usage corresponds to how the term ‘ideocracy’ is
used in the only Anglophone monograph on the topic to date, which defines it as
“a political system whose activities are pursued in reference to the tenets of a
monistic ideology”,1 a regime which directly contrasts with pluralistic democracy.
The main focus here will be the deeper psycho - cultural dynamics of political
situations in which an elite consciously sets out to realize a “monistic”, totalitar-
ian world - view through social engineering, and not just through social coercion,
to overcome the perceived failure, injustice, or decadence of a modern pluralis-
tic society and at some point in the process of attempted realization of this proj-
ect is able to count on a significant degree of popular support and consensus
thanks to the mass - mobilizing power of its vision of the new order. The legiti-
macy that results is thus different both from the ( in Weberian terms ) “tradi-
tional” authority that underpins pre - modern religious societies and the “legal -
rational” authority of liberal societies, but also from the enforced but inauthentic
legitimation secured through the coercive terror and propaganda apparatus of
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes which exercise a state monopoly over cul-
tural production and political thought with no genuine popular base.
Despite this exclusive focus, it should be remembered that pluralistic liberal-
ism can also develop ideocratic elements which repress pluralism and distort
democratic processes and would be worth investigating in relationship to the
issue of totalitarian legitimacy. The Jacobin vision of the French Revolution,
McCarthyism, the domino effect model of the communist threat that led the US
administration to escalate the Vietnam War while publically claiming to scale
down the resources committed to it, Thatcherism, at its most aggressively anti -
socialist, and the neo - Conservatism that led to the invasion of Iraq after 9/11 all
suggest that neat distinctions between ideocratic and democratic societies can-
not be drawn. However, the way ideocracy is being used here precludes the con-
sideration of the abuse of power in a system of political pluralism. It also rules
out authoritarian societies where ideology plays a minimal or purely instrumen-
tal, Machiavellian, or cosmetic role in dictating policies and the ruling elites pur-
sue no utopian vision of social engineering beyond the elimination of the per-
ceived enemies of social and political stability ( which, according to the official
ideology, can be represented by liberalism, communism, fascism, freedom of
thought, capitalism, Judaism, religious pluralism etc ). Such authoritarian
regimes, examples of which are military dictatorships, personal dictatorships,
and non - revolutionary conservative or communist dictatorships may produce
elaborate rationalizations for their claim to absolute power over the individual
and civil society, but lack the ambition to undertake the shaping of a new type of
modern society and a “new man” according to an ideological blueprint which is
symptomatic of a genuine ideocracy.
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It should also be pointed out that the basic premise of ideocracy, namely the
possibility of a primacy of ideas in a political context, is a contested concept.
Certainly many political scientists may agree with the sentiments of Romain
Rolland who in his introduction to “Clérambault” (1921), first published in
Swiss newspapers in December in 1917 at the height of the mutual slaughter of
the First World War, states that “Humanity does not dare to massacre itself from
interested motives. It is not proud of its interests, but it does pride itself on its
ideas which are a thousand times more deadly.”2 Such an assertion, however,
must remain deeply suspect to Marxists of all complexions even if Marx himself
sometimes broke with the strictures of the materialist conception of history, for
example, when he recognized that the legal institution of private property ( a
super - structural force ) was the precondition for the development of capitalist
economics and production ( a structural force ).3 A number of other Marxist the-
orists can be cited to uphold an anti - determinist variant of Marxism, notably
Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht, Antonio Gramsci, Jacques Lacan, and all pro-
tagonists of voluntarist interpretations of the revolutionary process, not least
Lenin himself who once declared “Politics must take precedence over econom-
ics. To argue otherwise is to forget the ABC of Marxism”.4
This paper rejects both crudely materialist theories of history, but also
Hegelian idealism and other forms of ideocentric approaches. It assumes instead
a complex, dynamic, but non - dialectical and non - determinist relationship
between the economic ( structural ) and ideological ( super - structural ) factors
conditioning the evolution of history as well as among the social elites imposing
the hegemony of certain political ideas and the subjects of an autocratic elite,
who far from always being passive victims, may in some circumstances become
its enthusiastic supporters and the protagonists of the historical transformation
in their own right. This results in a fluctuating, irreducibly complex role played
by ideology in establishing consensual legitimation, which can never be the prod-
uct of the power of ideas in itself.
II. The Neglected Area of Populist Legitimation in Ideocracies
One unintended consequence of the Cold War climate in which much pioneer-
ing academic work on totalitarianism was carried out in the West was that total-
itarianism became associated with the coerced consensus of closed, monocratic
societies ( National Socialist or Communist ), in contrast to the ( no less mythi-
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cized ) “open”, polycratic societies of the “Free World” where, ( pace Noam
Chomsky,5 Herbert Marcuse6 et al.), a consensus was allegedly not “manufac-
tured” or imposed as a form of totalitarianism. Instead, a symbiotic relationship
was assumed or claimed to exist between the policies of political elites and the
“will of the people” expressed through its mandated representatives. Western
academia in particular was largely “value free”, a laissez - faire market of ideas
mirroring the economic market. The image of ideocracies imposed through
repression, propaganda, and terror purely for the purpose of retaining power, or
as the prelude to world domination, found its most comprehensive, sophisti-
cated, and at times cryptic, academic expression in Hannah Arendt’s “The
Origins of Totalitarianism” (1951) and was reinforced in the popular imagina-
tion by such classic fictional studies of the subject as Arthur Koestler’s
“Darkness at Noon” (1940), George Orwell’s “1984” (1949), and Jean - Luc
Goddard’s “Alphaville : The Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution” (1965).
Even Emilio Gentile’s post - Cold War definition of totalitarianism (2000), which
breaks new ground in recognizing explicitly the revolutionary aspirations of
totalitarianism, contains no allusion to the possibility of a spontaneous commu-
nity of believers emerging under the new regime willing to contribute energeti-
cally and proactively to its realization. By stressing “domination” it remains a
“governor’s view of the prison” : 
“The term ‘totalitarianism’ can be taken as meaning an experiment in political dom-
ination undertaken by a revolutionary movement, with an integralist conception of
politics that aspires toward a monopoly of power and that, after having secured
power, whether by legal or illegal means, destroys or transforms the previous regime
and constructs a new state based on a single - party regime with the chief objective of
conquering society. That is, it seeks the subordination, integration, and homogenisa-
tion of the governed on the basis of the integral politicisation of existence, whether
collective or individual, interpreted according to the categories, the myths, and the
values of a palingenetic ideology institutionalised in the form of a political religion
that aims to shape the individual and the masses through an anthropological revolu-
tion in order to regenerate the human being and create the new man who is dedi-
cated in body and soul to the realisation of the revolutionary and imperialistic poli-
cies of the totalitarian party. The ultimate goal is to create a new civilisation along
ultra - nationalist lines.”7
The overdetermined academic concentration on a coerced rather than a sponta-
neous consensus in totalitarian societies has led to extensive studies of the impo-
sition of ideology through apparatuses of social control and social engineering,
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and, in particular, through the use of an elaborate political religion, intensive
verbal and non - verbal propaganda, and terror. Classics in this respect are Klaus
Vondung’s “Magie und Manipulation – Ideologischer Kult und politi sche
Religion des Nationalsozialismus” (1971) and Emilio Gentile’s “The Sa -
cralization of Politics in Fascist Italy” (1996). This top - down approach to under-
standing the power of totalitarian ideology is applied even by such a ground-
breaking and sophisticated exercise in comparative totalitarian studies as David
Roberts’ “The Totalitarian Experiment in the Twentieth - Century” (2006) and
Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Beyond Totalitarianism (2009), where
periods of spontaneous populist enthusiasm for both the Nazi and the Soviet
regimes are not foregrounded, and their deep - seated causes are not explored.8
In this paper the focus is different. The paper offers a generic conceptual
framework set out with the hope of encouraging future research in comparative
totalitarian studies to focus more effectively and productively on the way certain
ideocracies can under certain conditions derive their legitimation ( however tem-
porary ) spontaneously from the intrinsic power of their ideology to meet the spe-
cific psycho - cultural needs which have arisen from the process of modernization
in certain segments of the population. It is a partial consensus that causes a sig-
nificant percentage of its subjects to promote revolution or to “work towards the
system”9 rather than being or feeling repressed by it. 
Such an approach deliberately departs from “The Politics of Ideocracy”,
which states in its opening chapter that “The legitimacy of an ideocratic political
system [...] is derived from the monistic ideology which establishes a universal
frame of reference for participants of the system”. It goes on to assert that what
sets ideocracies apart from all other political systems is that their legitimacy is
derived “exclusively from the tenets of the ideology itself”,10 ignoring the crucial
issue of the degree of subjective recognition, internalization, and resonance of
that ideology within the “masses” ( or explaining how a set of ideas can legitimize
itself without human agency ). 
It should be stressed that this “prisoners’ view of the prison” approach to
legitimacy which concentrates on the populist embrace of an ideocracy is hardly
new. Rather it is yet another example of “reinventing the wheel”. It is often over-
looked – especially in reductive summaries of the book on websites – that
Friedrich and Brzezinski’s classic text, “Totalitarian Dictatorship and Auto -
cracy” (1956) stresses that the “official ideology” of a totalitarian state is
“focused and projected towards a perfect final state of mankind” ( or rather an
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elite segment of it ) and thus contains “a chiliastic claim based on the radical
rejection of the existing society and the conquest of the world for a new one”.11
The authors make it clear that they do not just conceive this as manipulative
propaganda. They argue that genuine totalitarian projects centre on the creation
of a “new man”, and display “strongly Utopian elements”, or “some kind of
notion of a paradise on earth” which gives them “a pseudo - religious qual-
ity”.These features elicit in “their less critical followers a depth of conviction and
a fervour of devotion found only among persons inspired by a transcendent
faith” to a point where the ideocratic goals act as what Marx described as “the
opium of the people”.12 The conclusion to be drawn is that, though a populist
consensus for ideocracies is rarely taken into account by human scientists, the
pioneers of academic totalitarian studies themselves specifically stress that legit-
imation in such regimes may derive at least partly from the enthusiastic ( less crit-
ical ) or even fanatical ( completely uncritical ) belief of the supporters in their
leaders’ vision of the future and their policies to achieve it, whenever the official
Utopia finds a deep psychological resonance in the masses.
This paper thus reverses the prevalent regime - centric perspective in totalitar-
ian studies by concentrating on the potential of ideas to assume a powerful
mythic force to mobilize spontaneous populist energies, especially in the revolu-
tionary phase of overthrowing the old order and establishing a new totalitarian
society. It suggests that the stereotypical image of totalitarianism in the “Free
World” epitomized in “1984” has been derived from an excessive, if understand-
able, concentration on the enforced ideocracies of imposed, feigned, failed, or
spent totalitarian revolutions. These either had no authentic ideological vitality
to begin with, or have degenerated into bureaucratic autocracies drained of gen-
uine populist energy to be manipulated and now bankrupt in the charismatic
currency originally emanating from the leader and his vision of the future.
III. Modelling the Dynamics of Charismatic Ideologies
The implication of this reference to the leader’s ‘vision of the future’ is that the
Weberian concept of “charisma” should be extended from being treated exclu-
sively as a property of personalities ( or rather an interaction between “outstand-
ing” individuals and the psychological needs of followers to project their fan-
tasies onto them ), to being treated also as a property of ideologies when they
assume a powerful populist momentum by the belief that aggregations of individ-
uals invest in them and the actions that flow from these beliefs. This process of a
spontaneous, charismatic ideocratic legitimation of regime change can occur
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without leadership as in the early phase of the French Revolution and in the
1989 anti - totalitarian revolutions in Europe where the idea of freedom from
state communism acquired its own mass - mobilizing potency. In this context the
key social theory is no longer Weber’s concept of charismatic authority or even
Durkheim’s theory of “collective effervescence” laid out in “Elementary Forms
of Religious Life” (1912) and eminently applicable to modern secular religions
which aim to reverse anomie. Instead, it is Georges Sorel’s analysis in “Reflex -
ions on Violence” (1908) of the power of myths and utopias to unleash forces of
social transformation. Far from being a value - free exercise in academic specula-
tion, Sorel looked optimistically to the emergence of new mass - mobilizing myths
in his era to act as the source of palingenetic populist forces capable of regener-
ating a bourgeois society he saw mired in moral torpor, complacency, material-
ism, and decadence. 
It would be possible at this point to construct analytical tools from a reading
of Nietzsche to flesh out the theory that some totalitarian regimes deliberately
enlisted the psycho - dynamic energies generated by a spontaneous revolt against
nihilism and the prospect of Western civilization petering out in a generation of
mythless, passionless “last men” with irretrievably anomic, spiritually moribund
lives. However, it would be even more profitable to widen the academic debate
about ideocracies even further by introducing elements drawn from anthropo-
logical research into pre - modern movements of ideological renewal. By applying
insights from the work of such experts as Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner,
Mathieu Deflem, Anthony Wallace, and Peter Berger it is possible to construct a
coherent model of the ideological dynamics of situations when the cohesion of
both traditional and modern societies break down and give rise to a new society
arising Phoenix - like from the ashes of the old on the basis of a new world view
or value - system.13 This line of enquiry leads to the formulation of heuristic con-
cepts that arguably have a profound bearing on the understanding of twentieth
century totalitarianism, allowing periods to be identified when ideocracy and
populist revolutionary demands entered a temporary synergy. 
Reduced to its bare bones, the composite theory that results from this excur-
sion into neighbouring provinces of the human sciences suggests that one way a
society can fail ( or a symptom of its failure ) is when the traditional myths and rit-
uals which together constitute its nomos ( total world - view and law ) no longer
provide a coherent sense of communal meaning, purpose, and reality. At this
point they enter a liminoid state ( experienced as crisis, chaos, anarchy, deca-
dence, decline, or the end of time ) which is resolved either by the collapse of that
society, its absorption into another, more powerful culture, or its internal, endo-
genic renewal. This is brought about through a “revitalization movement” which
provides a new collective source of existential legitimacy, psycho - social coher-
ence, and nomic vitality. Characteristic of cultural regeneration is the emergence
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of a propheta ( a charismatic leader ) who embodies the vision of a new nomos
(a new sect, new religion, new principle for making sense of and re - ordering
society ) as the basis of a new society ( communitas ). If the embodied nomos can
attract enough followers during a nomic crisis to gain a critical mass of support,
a secessionist movement or sect forms able to serve as the nucleus of a new soci-
ety, though it may have to occupy new territory to establish the new religious -
 ritual community.
This process of renewal has been repeated countless times in innumerable
unique permutations within human history to perpetuate communities in their
constant process of renewal, of palingenesis. Indeed, every new religion can be
seen as a largely spontaneous ideocracy born of a nomic crisis resolved through
the formation of a new community centred on a new nomos embodied in a new
propheta, a new scripture or a new oral narrative of the cosmos, and new rituals
and observances. 
It is clear from this approach that the propheta’s charisma is intimately bound
up with the dramatic process of social revitalization, of cultural death and
rebirth, and the mythic power of the embryonic new nomos in which the new
identity ( embodied in a new man and woman ) is crystallized. Each reborn soci-
ety thus involves a process of ideological renewal and establishes the hegemony
of a new ideocracy experienced not as an abstract theory or imposed moral code
but as a lived reality, a total but not necessarily totalitarian, new order. 
Once modern European history is approached from the vantage point of pre -
modern revitalization movements new interpretive vistas will open up in totali-
tarian studies. The chronic ambivalence ( Zygmunt Bauman ), liquefaction ( Zyg -
munt Bauman ), and dis - embedding of reality ( Anthony Giddens ) under moder-
nity, and the resulting liquefaction of its earlier solidity ( Karl Marx, Marshall
Berman ) creates – at least for some – a permanent sense of decadence or nomic
crisis and, hence, an apocalyptic sense of living constantly on the edge of history
torn between fears of social breakdown and hopes for total renewal.14 This sub-
liminal predisposition to live life more meaningfully against a permanent back-
drop of angst and anomie can turn into a severe sense of total collapse in times
of objective, external socio - political crisis, which can make millions vulnerable to
the lure of palingenetic myths of total renewal in moments of structural crisis.15
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IV. Modern( ist ) Socio - political Renewal
It is on the basis of this line of argument that it is possible to identify the subter-
ranean link between modernist art and architecture and a wide range of social
and political reform movements which dominated European culture between
1880 and 1914 ( when the Western intelligentsia were dominated by a subjective
sense of cultural crisis experienced as decadence ). The palingenetic climate was
then intensified between 1914 and 1939 when, objectively, the liberal capitalist
world could easily appear to be in a state of terminal collapse, signaling the end
of civilization or inaugurating the birth of a new age. This ambivalent mood of
catastrophe and the possibility of palingenesis were captured particulately in the
first issue of the Austrian cultural review “Die Moderne” published in 1890. Its
founder Hermann Bahr proclaimed : 
“Es geht eine wilde Pein durch diese Zeit und der Schmerz ist nicht mehr erträglich.
Der Schrei nach dem Heiland ist gemein und Gekreuzigte sind überall. Ist es das
große Sterben das über die Welt gekommen ? Es kann sein, dass wir am Ende sind,
am Tode der erschöpften Menschheit, und das sind nur die letzten Krämpfe. Es kann
sein, dass wir am Anfange sind, an der Geburt einer neuen Menschheit, und das sind
nur die Lawinen des Frühlings. Wir steigen ins Göttliche oder wir stürzen, stürzen in
Nacht und Vernichtung – aber Bleiben ist keines. Dass aus dem Leide das Heil kom-
men wird und die Gnade aus der Verzweiflung, dass es tagen wird nach dieser ent-
setzlichen Finsternis und dass die Kunst einkehren wird bei den Menschen – diese
Auferstehung, glorreich und selig, das ist der Glaube der Moderne.”16
The permanent liminoidality of modernity, which was palpable in cosmopolitan
life by the 1880s, generated countless individual moods of apocalyptic despair
and palingenetic hope , for what Walter Benjamin called “exploding the contin-
uum”17 which in turn fuelled revitalization movements in every sphere of cul-
tural production, all expressing an existential longing for purification, a total new
order, an overarching vision of reality, rebirth and new beginning. These move-
ments included the “Deutsche Lebensreformbewegung” ( “German Life Reform
Movement” ), vitalism, monism, naturism, rationalist architecture, theosophy,
anthroposophy, Zionism, Freudianism, Jungianism, Nietzscheanism, youth
movements, social hygiene and eugenics, and various types of organic national-
ism, socialism, and political racism. They also included a whole array of new aes-
thetics and their corresponding “isms” ( expressionism, fauvism, surrealism,
dadaism etc ). 
All attempts to establish a new aesthetic in the quest for a higher spiritual
truth – a quest epitomized in Wassily Kandinsky’s “Concerning the Spiritual in
Art”(1914) – are collectively known as “Modernism”, a term generally restricted
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to artistic phenomena. However in “Modernism and Fascism” I make a sus-
tained case for seeing aesthetic modernism as simply the artistic manifestation of
a welter of palingenetic movements of the period that can all be seen as idiosyn-
cratic modern forms of a revitalization movement and, hence, as forms of social
modernism. In this book I further distinguish between epiphanic modernism,
where the dark clouds of anomie may break to reveal to the artist glimpses of
deeper understanding or shafts of light may traverse the sky emanating from a
higher level of “Being”, and programmatic modernism, where the protagonists
undertake the self - appointed mission to regenerate society through promoting
healthy activities ( e. g. hiking, calisthenics ), or life - asserting forms of architec-
ture, dance, or social mores. The Monte Verità community which thrived above
Ascona on the Swiss shore of Lake Maggiore between 1900 and 1926 was a
microcosm of the experiments with alternative life - styles that characterized gen-
uine modernism ( as opposed to its commodified travesties )18 while also demon-
strating the porous membranes that existed at the turn of the 20th century
between various types of epiphanic and programmatic, artistic and social mod-
ernism.
V. The Establishment of Populist Ideocracy 
The form of modernism which was to have the most profound – indeed cata-
strophic – impact on modern history to date was political modernism. The inten-
sifying liminoidality generated by modernity in 19th century European history
gradually turned patriotic nationalism into a force which under democratic and
liberal institutional guises hosted powerful irrational organic myths about racial
purity, and historical destiny in a number of countries. To this extent, the First
World War can be seen as an explosion of repressed state and populist mod-
ernist energies directed towards nebulous aspirations to defend culture and iden-
tity from demonized enemy forces, which demanded countless blood sacrifices.
Even in the most ostensibly democratized countries patriotism was temporarily
totalitarianized by the ruling elites for the duration of the war, and the calls to
fight for “God and country” ( whatever the God or country ) resonated with pow-
erful palingenetic longings in the general public, and even among the combatant
soldiers, many of whom continued to legitimate delusional chauvinist myths
from below despite the horrors of combat.19
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It is absolutely consistent with this model that in the three European coun-
tries where attempts were made to establish palingenetic ideocracies, Soviet
Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, the regimes achieved a high level of
popular consensus as the solution to a general crisis not just of the state but of
reality itself. After decades of socio - political tensions and crises punctuated by
attempted anarchist and Marxist revolutionary assaults on the status quo, the
Bolshevik revolution initially unleashed a flood of revolutionary fervour in the
artistic and intellectual elites20 and was supported by considerable popular
enthusiasm, despite the enormous privations endured by the population. Fascist
Italy was extensively legitimated by a cult of the duce and mass populist support
for Fascism’s programme of rapid modernization and the “nationalization of the
masses” between 1928 and 1936. The charismatic energies were orchestrated
and intensified but not created or merely inculcated by the elaborate displays of
religious politics associated with “the cult of the Fasces”,21 a support that only
evaporated once it was realized by ‘ordinary people’ that their country was inex-
orably being dragged into a major European war by the Axis. 
It is within this context that it is worth considering the Third Reich as an
ideocracy that for a number of years, namely from 1933 until Stalingrad ( the
Winter of 1942/1943), was both imposed through social control, propaganda,
coercion, and terror while, simultaneously, generating enough authentic pop-
ulist support to be legitimized through spontaneous charismatic energies.
Marginalized electorally until the Wall Street Crash (1929), the ensuing socio -
political crisis was acute enough to engender a deep nomic collapse, a general
“sense - making crisis”22 fuelled by deep - seated anxieties about national identity
and a collective sense of national humiliation and impotence resulting from the
catastrophic outcome of the World War, both of which precipitated a collective
loss of hope for the future once the Depression struck. In an unfolding process,
meticulously documented in the first volume of Ian Kershaw’s biography of
Hitler, “Hubris”, Nazism was able to offer millions of existentially desperate
individuals in the grip of profound anomie a total worldview, a new sense of
belonging, a new nomos to believe in, and a new sacred canopy under which to
live out their lives. A miraculous propheta had arisen who held the key to the
future, whose Weltanschauung promised a new start in history, which would
solve the nation’s crisis, overcome the decadence of Western civilization, and
free them from their own existential dilemmas. 
Once in power, and for as long as its seemed to be fulfilling its promises of
total regeneration, Nazism was able to establish itself for nearly a decade as an
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ideocracy legitimated – given its violence against internal enemies – to a disturb-
ing extent by mass charismatic energies and widely diffused mythic palingenetic
expectations projected onto the Führer. Nazi ideology thus became the base of a
new communitas ( “Volksgemeinschaft” ) bent on revitalizing and purifying
German society by destroying the institutions and human incarnations of deca-
dence, putting an end to the liminoidality of modernity through the estab -
lishment of a “new order” in Germany and Europe, and starting time again by
instituting a healthy alternative modernity to both Liberal Capitalism and
Communism. The first of these would be ruthlessly harnessed to the nation’s
needs and the second would be destroyed, along with all other human sources of
ideological decay, cultural decadence, dysgenic breeding, and societal Zer -
setzung.
The basis of the legitimation of the Third Reich was therefore not just the vio-
lent usurpation of power and the destruction of pluralism by force, but the emer-
gence of a palingenetic community23 diffused throughout Germany which vol -
untarily “worked towards the Führer”.24 Inevitably, the project to create an
organic, morally and physically reborn Volksgemeinschaft as the laboratory of
the “new German man” and the “new German woman” was doomed to failure
in the long run. Yet in the 1930s it was taken seriously by the regime and mil-
lions of previously liberal citizens, many of whom underwent a voluntary process
of Nazification, which in many cases outlasted the war ( in marked contrast to
the general failure of Fascistization, even before 1943).
VI.  The Nomic Dynamics of “Living” Ideocracies 
The process by which a spontaneous elective affinity can arise between a signifi-
cant segment of the population of an autocratic state and the totalizing ideology
through which it seeks to mould the mindsets of the future inhabitants of the
new order is illuminated by Luciano Pellicani’s theory of “God’s orphans”.25 In
his neglected but important analysis of political fanaticism, “Revolutionary
Apocalypse. Ideological Roots of Terrorism” (2001), published in Italian before
9/11, he analyses the situation of modern human beings caught in liminoid
phases of culture, and who thus have a deep thirst for total Gnostic truths about
the cosmos in a world spiritually ripped to shreds by the nomocidal impact of
modernity. Since they cannot go back to the safe confines of traditional feudal
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life, nor forward to embrace the atomization and liquefaction of contemporary
liberal society, some find themselves forced into the “Third Way” of an extreme
utopianism. Exiled from the Divine Truth of pre - modern societies, they conjure
up totalizing ideologies of revolutionary transformation shot through with apoc-
alyptic visions of creative destruction, purging violence, and the extermination
of demonized and dehumanized enemies as the precondition for the realization
of the new order. Pellicani argues that this “Gnostic” syndrome of positive
nihilism, and the Zealotic fanaticism it generates, was central to shaping the
events of the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution,
the Nazi Revolution, and early Maoism; in other studies he finds parallel pro -
cesses at work in Islamist terrorism.
Once the lost souls of modernity become converts to a secular “Gnostic” and
apocalyptic movement of total historical transformation, the World becomes
mythicized and is split into a Manichaean universe of good and evil. Potential
recruits all too easily succumb to the redemptive appeal of the metanarrative
which convinces them they belong to a non - military army of “the just” engaged
in a cosmic struggle against the damned, or the enemies of a “healthy” society. In
the process, God’s orphans metamorphise into “Promethean Builders of the
Millennial Kingdom”.26 They undergo a process of what in my study of the socio-
psychological dynamics of terrorism I have called “heroic doubling”, formerly
anomic individuals becoming transformed into cosmic warriors.27 It is a process
deeply akin to what some anomic individuals experienced when they partici-
pated in a Nazi rally, the “worm” of the atomized self metamorphosing into “a
great dragon”.28 The fanatic that results from this process ( familiar from the
French Revolution as a “Jacobin” ) is the vital, living cell of an embodied ideo -
cracy in its revolutionary or populist regime phase. At the core of his or her con-
version lies not “brainwashing” by a charismatic leader or an ideocratic state but
the powerful drive to find an identity which resolves the nomic crisis born of the
combination of the nomocidal impact of modernity and combined with the dis -
embedding impact of a socio - political situation. As Eric Hoffer put it in “The
True Believer” (1951), a lucid study of extremist political movements which is
unencumbered by academic qualifications or elaborate scholarly apparatus :
“The true believer who is wholly assimilated into a compact collective body is no
longer frustrated. He has found a new identity and a new life. He is one of the
chosen, bolstered and protected by invincible powers, and destined to inherit the
earth. His is a state of mind the very opposite of that of the frustrated individual;
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yet he displays, with increased intensity, all the reactions which are symptomatic
of inner tension and insecurity”.29
If small in number, these latter - day “Jacobins” may become part of a self -
appointed terrorist30 or revolutionary vanguard, but particularly profound
sense- making crises may produce enough “God’s orphans” to form a critical
mass of revolutionary zeal channelled into support for the installation or consol-
idation of the ideocracy. This happened in the Jacobin phase of the French
Revolution, in the First World War ( in the so - called “war fever” that broke out in
some countries ), the Bolshevik Revolution ( at least until Lenin’s death ), the
Fascist Revolution ( but only after the regime had been established ), in numerous
liberation struggles ( Algeria, Sri Lanka, Sikh ), and the Iranian Revolution in its
formative phase. It would be worth revisiting various phases of the Maoist
Revolution to establish if there was any genuinely populist charismatic legitima-
tion involved behind the orchestrated displays of mass fanaticism. In each case it
is the dynamics of a revitalization movement which emerges in response to a
nomic crisis that should be examined in order to help explain the power of the
ideology, not just the brainwashing techniques of a coercive regime or the self -
legitimizing component attributed to ideas in an ideocracy. Such an examination
is called for whenever more is involved in legitimation than the meaningless legit-
imacy and simulated belief emanating from a regime’s deployment of autocratic
power and terror. What drives genuine totalitarian movements, after all, is not
just the megalomania of the leaders but their followers’ existential longing for a
new nomos, for palingenesis : “[ The true believers’ ] innermost craving is for a
new life – a rebirth – or, failing this, a chance to acquire new elements of pride,
confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and worth by identification with a holy
cause. An active mass - movement offers them opportunities for both. If they join
the movement as full converts they are reborn to a new life in its close - knit col-
lective body, or if attracted as sympathizers they find elements of pride, confi-
dence, and purpose by identifying with the efforts, achievements, and prospects
of the movement.”31
What legitimates an ideocracy from below is thousands or even millions of
worms becoming magically transformed by charismatic social energies into zeal-
ous parts of the new socio - political dragon. The act of joining a totalitarian
movement which fuels a revolution or provides support for an effective ideo -
cracy “cures the frustrated, not by conferring on them an absolute truth or by
remedying the difficulties and abuses which made their lives miserable, but by
freeing them from their ineffectual selves – and it does this by enfolding and
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absorbing them into a closely knit and exultant corporate whole”.32 It should be
noted, however, that not all endogenous totalitarian regimes have emerged in
modern history with significant populist legitimation. For example, the commu-
nist Hungarian state which resulted from Bela Kun’s coup was overthrown
before it had demonstrated its potential to harness legitimizing charismatic ener-
gies within the population or develop into a full - fledged ideocracy. Pol Pot’s
Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, intended to wipe out or terrorize into submis-
sion the existing population and to wait until a new youth grew up programmed
through intensive secondary socialization to embody the dialect of the utopian
national communism that he sought to realize. It thus made no attempt to im -
pose an ideocracy on the current generation of Cambodians.
VII. Legitimacy in “Dead” Ideocracies 
Even when utopianism is the life - blood of an ideocracy, the charismatic,
dynamic, populist phase of legitimacy that results is essentially unsustainable as
the brute facts that prevent the claimed Utopia being realized mount ever higher
and the contradictions between rhetoric and reality become ever more undeni-
able to increasingly disenchanted eyes and ears. Moreover, it should be borne in
mind that for a significant majority of the population the ideocracy has never
resolved their personal sense - making crisis even at the time of revolutionary
upheaval, let alone in the period of normalization under the resulting state. It
should also be emphasized that not all human beings, even in the most anarchic
of social dysfunctions, experience a nomic crisis since some are temperamentally
more resistant to anomie than others even in intensely liminoid situations, and
many more feel safely protected by another sacred canopy, whether it is religious
faith, a rival political vision or intense personal relations. It is when populist
legitimacy starts haemorrhaging from the system that the repressive techniques
of totalitarian rule come into play. They enforce outward conformity, mass - pro-
duce feigned commitment, and suppress factionalism, opposition, dissent, and
resistance. As true belief drains away, the coercive apparatus may take over the
task of orchestrating propaganda, political religion, and the leader cult while
escalating oppression in order to bridge the widening credibility gap between the
regime’s utopian aspirations and promises and its actual achievement. A close
study of Baathist Iraq under Saddam Husain would put much - needed empirical
flesh on this skeleton of abstraction. Orwell’s “Animal Farm” (1945) is also a
seminal fictional narrative that traces the rise and fall of a charismatic ideocracy.
Alternatively, the whole ideocratic regime may gradually decay into a banal
daily hell of bureaucratic rationalization, fossilized utopianism, and routinized
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charisma, one where a rising tide of collective ennui drowns out the last vestiges
of genuine enthusiasm, but most still feel compelled to admire the emperor’s
new clothes, even though they have become all too transparent. It is a situation
magnificently portrayed in Aleksandr Zinoviev’s dissident novel, “Yawning
Heights” (1978). In contemporary China, revolutionary Maoism seems to have
atrophied into a new form of Marxian - Confucian Capitalism overseen but no
longer run by Big Brother. The terror machine is kept well oiled and fed with vic-
tims but discretely located away from the sky - scrapers, advertising billboards,
and business hotels of capitalist socialism.33 For over a billion human beings in
China this has resulted in an existential reality of having to endure daily the ten-
sion between the collective nomos proclaimed by the ideocracy and a private
anomie that officially does not exist. This dilemma has yet to find a novelist or a
playwright who is accessible to non - Chinese writers. In the meantime, Ai Weiwei
has made heroic efforts to use the visual arts to break the fetters of ideological
tyranny and conformism and expose the “internal contradictions of socialism” to
the West.34
Numerically more common than decayed, defunct endogenous ideocracies in
the 20th century were the exogenous ideocratic regimes which were established
with minimal or no domestic revolutionary struggle. Instead they were simply
imposed by a totalitarian “mother” power in a sustained act of colonial force on
an unwilling foreign “satellite” population and thus could never generate exten-
sive domestic charismatic populist energies. Such regimes were forced by the
logic of autocratic power in the age of the masses to stage elaborate displays of
political religion and mount extensive campaigns of propaganda, indoctrination,
and re - education which aped the outward form of charismatic legitimation, but
without the substance. Certainly, there may have been a small percentage of
indigenous true believers to keep the puppet regime going, but they were vastly
outnumbered by the ranks of opportunists, careerists, and survivors prepared to
outwardly convert to the ideocracy’s world - view for cynical, egotistical, or sur-
vivalist motives. In such cases, it was the initial act of coercion followed by the
normalization of the regime through the secondary socialization of a new gener-
ation that sustained its legitimacy, not a fluctuating tide of genuine ideological
fervour and Gnostic longings for a new order and a new future. “Propaganda”
under such ideocracies loses its original ingredient of faith and acquires its mod-
ern connotations of brainwashing and manipulation. 
This model broadly applies to all Soviet satellite states. Classic case studies
are provided by the GDR, Communist Czechoslovakia, and North Korea, which
has developed into an elaborate imposed ideocracy of its own. Other examples
are Romania under Ceausescu, Tibet under Chinese occupation, and all Nazi
satellites formed during the Second World War and integrated willy - nilly into the
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“Europäische Neuordnung”. Each pseudo - charismatic regime creates deep exis-
tential dilemmas for all those subjects who find outward conformity does not sat-
isfy their existential and nomic needs. They are often torn between the drive to
rid themselves of false consciousness and bad faith by heroically devoting their
lives to freedom, truth and, hence, to resistance at great personal risk, and the
opposing need to survive materially ( sometimes for the sake of loved ones ) and
to avoid physical pain This can lead to collaboration of varying degrees of inten-
sity and inward commitment, with many apparent converts to the alien regime
immigrating inwardly while outwardly complying with official beliefs to over-
come the anguish of cognitive dissonance and to be able to function in everyday
life. The plays of Václav Havel such as “Audience” (1975) written at the height of
communist repression are testimonies to the intense, anguished inner lives gen-
erated by being forced to live under a “dead” ideocracy while clinging to human-
ist values.
VIII. Conclusion : Implications for the Study of Ideocracies
This paper has several implications for the comparative study of the dynamics of
legitimation within totalitarian ideocracies. First, it suggests that a distinction is
to be made for heuristic purposes between i ) ideocracies which, due to being
imposed on a society from within at the height of a liminoid crisis of society, are
able to generate genuine currents of populist legitimacy by harnessing general-
ized longings to belong to a new nomic community, even several years after the
establishment of the totalitarian regime ( as in Fascist Italy ); and ii ) ideocracies
imposed from without by an imperialist or colonial power, hence lacking the pre-
conditions for an extensive populist base, or ideocracies whose popular reser-
voirs of genuine ideological fervour have dried up and now function solely as
pseudo - populist autocracies. Second, it claims that more work is needed on the
revolutionary dynamics of totalitarian revolutions in the context of the mod-
ernist revolt against decadence and the resulting drive to find total solutions to
the West’s permanent state of nomic crisis and to impose closure on its perma-
nent liminoidality.
Third, it is clear that more work is required on the coexistence of ideocratic
and pseudo - ideocratic elements within the same regime, their relationship fluc-
tuating over time due to changing material and political circumstances which
make the realization and very survival of the regime more or less utopian. An
ideal contemporary case - study for such an investigation, but one which demands
advanced language skills and a deep understanding of Islam and Islamic society,
is the Iranian theocracy. Fourth, it would be helpful to explore how far Weberian
understanding of the “routinization of charisma” and the forces of rationaliza-
tion and bureaucratization could be applied fruitfully to understanding the
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process by which a “living” ideocracy, one partially legitimized by charismatic
forces from below, can degenerate into a “dead” ideocracy. 
By looking more critically and with a greater wealth of specialist knowledge of
specific regimes,at the distinction between coerced and spontaneous, living and
decayed ideocracies and the specific conditions that have produced their rise
and fall, not just in Europe but on all five continents, Western academics might
finally break out of decades of Eurocentric, inter - war–centric studies of totalitar-
ianism. They would then be in a position to start locating ideocracies properly
within modernity. In particular, they could begin relating a particular ideocracy
to the creative cosmological and ideogonic forces unleashed by the revolt against
actually existing modernity, a revolt driven by the primordial human need for an
eternal nomos in an age of permanent transience.
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